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1. Introduction
In the last decades, there has been a growing focus on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples under the UN machinery. The UN declared the decade 1994–2004 as the ﬁrst
‘World Decade on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and 2005–2015 as the second
decade.1 From 1994 to 2004 the theme for the ﬁrst decade was ‘Indigenous People:
Partnership in Action’.2 The main objective was the strengthening of international
cooperation for the solution of problems faced by indigenous people in such
areas as human rights, the environment, education and health. As a result, in 2002,
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was established as an advisory body to
the UN Economic and Social Council.3 Yet, one of the central purposes of the
decade was the development, standard setting and mainstreaming of the human
rights of indigenous peoples. One of the crucial issues was the adoption of a uni-
versal declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The adoption of a universal
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples is seen by many indigenous peoples
as a necessary step under international law to afﬁrm their right to a speciﬁc iden-
tity and to ensure their survival. Hence, the ‘UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples’ adopted by the Human Rights Council 4 at its ﬁrst session in
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1) See General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/163 (1994) and resolution A/RES/59/174 (2005).
2) General Assembly resolution 48/163 of 21 December 1993.
3) Economic and Social Council resolution 2000/22.
4) Difference has to be made between the ‘UN Draft Declaration’, which was adopted in 1994 by
the Sub-Commission, and the ‘UN Declaration’, which was adopted by the Human Rights Council in
June 2006. See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights Council resolution
2006/2 (29 June 2006), contained in UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (Annex). At the time of writing, the text
is to be adopted by the UN General Assembly.
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June 2006 has to be seen as a signiﬁcant development in the role of the UN for the
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. One of the key mottos of the UN has been
to support partnership between States and indigenous peoples. As afﬁrmed in the
preamble, the Declaration should serve as “a standard of achievement to be pursued
in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect.” This aspect of the Declaration is cru-
cial and reﬂects the role that UN human rights machinery has been playing over the
last decades, which after centuries of oppression and cultural assimilation has sup-
ported the establishment of a dialogue between States and indigenous peoples.
The present article explores the potential signiﬁcance of the adoption of an
international declaration in the development of international legal standards on
the rights of indigenous peoples. A continuing discussion regarding indigenous
peoples’ rights under international law is to appreciate to what extent indigenous
peoples could ﬁnd support under existing international legal standards (notably
non-discrimination and equality), or whether, based on the speciﬁcity of their
claims, there is a need to establish new ad hoc standards. Hence, in terms of the
debates surrounding the development of indigenous peoples’ rights, one of the
main contentions is focussed around the question of whether a speciﬁc regime is
necessary or whether they can be subsumed under general human rights law.
Despite the recent expanding jurisprudence generated by the UN treaty moni-
toring bodies on indigenous peoples’ rights,5 there are still questions on whether
general international human rights law can successfully accommodate indige-
nous peoples’ speciﬁc claims. Within such framework, the present article wishes
to examine to what extent the adoption of an international declaration could
serve as a positive force in the development of the rights of indigenous peoples
under international law. While the article generally focuses on the Declaration,
this is done with the view of examining the general development of speciﬁc rights
for indigenous peoples. By examining in depth the debates surrounding the
Declaration, the article wishes to explore how international law has developed on
several issues that make indigenous peoples’ rights a very speciﬁc branch of inter-
national law. Furthermore, the article will focus on the issues that have been
especially contentious in the drafting of the Declaration, namely the recognition
of indigenous peoples as ‘peoples’ under international law and the afﬁrmation of
their collective land rights. These two issues have been at the centre of the dis-
cussion in the establishment of the Declaration, and debate on these two core
issues reﬂects the importance of developing rights for indigenous peoples under
international law. Before analysing these two core issues, the article will first
explore the long road that led to the adoption of the Declaration by the Human
Rights Council in June 2006.
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5) See P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 2002).
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2. One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards: The Difficult Birth of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
As highlighted earlier in the introduction, there has been a long debate amongst
international lawyers and international institutions on the need to develop a spe-
ciﬁc branch of international law to protect indigenous peoples’ rights or whether
indigenous peoples should find protection under the universal international
regime that is applicable to all human beings. The following analysis explores,
ﬁrst, the debate on the need for a speciﬁc branch of international law in address-
ing indigenous peoples’ speciﬁc claims and, second, how this debate had reper-
cussions on the negotiations on the eventual adoption of a universal declaration.
2.1. Towards Speciﬁc Indigenous Rights
When addressing the rights of indigenous peoples under international law, the
first reference is the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The two ILO
Conventions (ILO Convention 107 (1957) and ILO Convention 169 (1989))
remain the only international binding instruments that specifically provide a
detailed list of rights for indigenous peoples. However, the ILO Convention 107
has been rightly criticised for being assimilationist,6 and the ILO Convention
169 has so far received 17 ratiﬁcations.7 Thus, we are far from a strong interna-
tional legal framework on the rights of indigenous peoples. Yet, this is only one
way of looking at international law and indigenous peoples as there is a very large
jurisprudence on the rights of indigenous peoples emerging from other interna-
tional bodies using general international instruments in their approach to indige-
nous peoples’ rights. This two-way vision depends on whether one would
examine indigenous peoples’ rights through the lens of special rights for indige-
nous peoples or whether one believes that indigenous peoples’ rights are part of
the larger category of human rights law.
This is reﬂected in the debate on the need for a speciﬁc category of rights for
indigenous peoples or whether indigenous peoples’ claims could ﬁnd protection
under the general human rights discourse on non-discrimination. Cornastell and
Primeau suggest that the existing body of human rights law is adequate to address
indigenous peoples’ claims.8 From this perspective, focusing on the development
Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230 209
6) Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 107), 328 UNTS 247 (1957).
7) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO
Convention 169), reprinted in ILM 1382 (1989).
8) J. Corntassel and T. H. Primeau, ‘Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised
Strategies for Pursuing ‘Self-Determination’, 17 H.R.Q. (1995) p. 342.
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of speciﬁc instruments would be counterproductive. As Brownlie puts it: “[T]he
heavy reliance on the still relatively controversial category of “indigenous peo-
ples” is difﬁcult to understand and, frankly, it smacks of nominalism and a sort
of snobbery.”9 On the other side of the spectrum, Berman has argued that indige-
nous peoples’ rights constitute a sui generis category of rights that arise outside of
the positive law system. They are “pre-existing rights in the sense that they are
not developed from the legal system of surrounding states but [they] arise sui
generis from the historical condition of indigenous peoples as distinctive societies
with the aspiration to survive as such.”10 Kingsbury has pointed out that indige-
nous peoples’ claims under international law come from five main different
directions: non-discrimination, minority rights, self-determination, historical
sovereignty and sui generis claims.11 Hence, while indigenous rights might ﬁnd
some ground within the main human rights discourse, Kingsbury points out that
there are still some aspects of indigenous claims that require a sui generis category.
Recent legal decisions affecting indigenous peoples support the development
of a speciﬁc indigenous approach to legal standards. For example, the 2001 deci-
sion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in the Awas Tingni
case, which is often regarded as one of the landmark decisions regarding indige-
nous peoples’ rights in recent years,12 signiﬁcantly supports the development of
a speciﬁc approach to indigenous peoples’ rights. What has been remarkable in
this landmark decision from the IACHR is that the judges opted for the ‘indi-
genisation’ of general human rights norms. While Article 21 of the American
Convention on Human Rights regarding property rights is framed in a general
way, the judges pointed out that such rights do have a specific meaning for
indigenous peoples. As the Court stated: “[T]hrough an evolutionary interpreta-
tion of international instruments for the protection of human rights (. . .) it is
the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the Convention protects the right to
property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the
indigenous communities within the framework of communal property (. . .).”13
One of the main limitations regarding the adaptability of the general human
rights discourse to indigenous peoples’ specific claims is its individualistic
210 Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230
9) I. Brownlie, Treaties and Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 63.
10) H. Berman, ‘Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical Personality?’, 79 ASIL
Proc. (1989) p. 193.
11) B. Kingsbury, ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims
in International and Comparative Law’, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001)
p. 109.
12) J. Anaya and C. Grossman, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, 19:1 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law (2002).
13) The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001,
IACHR, (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001), para. 148.
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framework. On this point, the decision of the Inter-American Court highlights
that general human rights could be adaptable to the speciﬁcity of indigenous
peoples’ claims. However, in the same breath, the judges pointed out that
the decision relied on the Court’s ‘evolutionary’ approach to international
human rights law, relying primarily on the ILO Convention 169, the UN
Declaration and the Organization of American States (OAS) Proposed American
Declaration as well as speciﬁc national laws on indigenous peoples’ rights. Thus,
the ‘indigenisation’ of the general right to property was based on more speciﬁc
instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples. From this perspective, the Inter-
American Court’s progressive approach seems to indicate that the most positive
development regarding the content of human rights discourse in relation to
indigenous peoples comes from the ILO Convention 169 and the UN and OAS
Declarations. From the judges’ point of view, there is an emerging corpus of inter-
national law on the rights of indigenous peoples and the ‘indigenisation’ of
Article 21 of the American Convention was a reflection of this development.
This indicates that even though general human rights norms can be used to
protect the rights of indigenous peoples, this is complemented by the emergence
of a specific legal framework that encompasses more distinctively indigenous
peoples’ claims.
On a theoretical level, with reference to the debate on ‘general human rights
versus speciﬁc indigenous regime’, the choice might not be of one versus another.
Rather, an adequate level of protection for indigenous peoples might be based on
both paths. On the one hand, general human rights norms on non-discrimina-
tion and equality are ﬂexible enough to include some protection for indigenous
peoples, but on the other hand, such ﬂexibility relies on a parallel development
of a speciﬁc regime of protection. The opening on property rights that took place
at the Inter-American level was based on the fact that “human rights treaties are
live instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times
and, speciﬁcally, to current living conditions”, and on the indication that this
evolution of the times was reﬂected in the development of a speciﬁc regime of
protection for indigenous peoples. Hence, the development of jurisprudence
from the UN human rights treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee
(HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) or
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on the
rights of indigenous peoples does not preclude the development of a specific
regime. Quite the opposite; these developments indicate that ‘the evolution of
the times’ supports the emergence of a speciﬁc focus on the protection of indige-
nous peoples. In the context of such developments, a general declaration has
to be seen as a statement of minimum standards on the rights of indigenous
peoples. This approach has been put forward by many indigenous representatives
who point out that the establishment of a universal declaration on the rights of
Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230 211
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indigenous peoples should be seen to be part of the “progressive development” of
international law.14
Furthermore, one of the dangers in the development of international law
regarding indigenous peoples’ rights is increasingly the problem of coherence.
The rights of indigenous peoples gradually developed under very different
international institutional settings, including the work of the ILO, the World
Bank, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the United Nations Forum on Forests, UN Development Programme (UNDP),
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the different UN human rights
monitoring bodies. However, there is no coherent afﬁrmation of indigenous peo-
ples’ rights under international law. Notably, crucial issues such as land rights,
collective rights and self-determination need to be addressed in a formal and par-
ticular way to ensure the coherence of international law on indigenous peoples’
rights. The development of a universal declaration could be seen as one attempt
to address in a systematic manner the different rights that are speciﬁc to indige-
nous peoples.
2.2. The Long Battle of the Working Groups
To get to the Human Rights Council in June 2006, the text of the UN
Declaration had to climb all the ladders of the UN hierarchy. Everything started
at the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
(hereinafter ‘Sub-Commission’) level. The UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP) was established in 1982 as a subsidiary organ of the Sub-
Commission with a two-fold mandate:
• to review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples;
• to give attention to the evolution of international standards concerning
indigenous rights.15
When the WGIP started its work, the only international instrument relating to
the rights of indigenous peoples was the ILO Convention 107. It had a limited
number of States parties and was seen as a very assimilationist text by most
indigenous peoples. Against this background, the WGIP started to work on the
212 Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230
14) See the joint statement issued by several indigenous organisations, Urgent Need to Improve the
U.N. Standard-Setting Process Importance of Criteria of ‘Consistent with International Law and Its
Progressive Development, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/CRP.3 (24 November 2005).
15) Economic and Social Council resolution 1982/34.
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text of a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The WGIP was actually
the ﬁrst global forum for indigenous peoples at the UN, and indigenous repre-
sentatives attending the meetings pointed out the lack of international standards.
Based on the specific nature of the WGIP, which remains an open forum for
indigenous peoples, the Working Group started to draft a text taking into
account the comments and suggestions of indigenous peoples’ representatives.
At its 11th session, in July 1993, the Working Group agreed on a ﬁnal text for
the ‘Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and submitted
it to the Sub-Commission.16 The text was then adopted by the Sub-Commission
in 1994.17
The text of the Draft Declaration was sent to the Commission on Human
Rights for its adoption. The Commission established an inter-sessional working
group, the Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD), to review the
text.18 The WGDD was composed of representatives of member states of the
Commission on Human Rights. Over the years, the WGDD has been meeting
several times both formally and informally, amid resolutions from the
Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly calling for the adop-
tion of the Draft Declaration. Moreover, one of the outcomes of the ﬁrst UN
decade on the rights of indigenous peoples (1994–2004) was expected to be the
adoption of a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples by the General
Assembly. Despite such calls, participants to the debates of the WGDD could
not agree on several points. Accordingly, 12 years after its adoption by the Sub-
Commission, the text was still far from being ready for adoption as only two out
of the 45 Articles of the Draft Declaration had been adopted.19
There have been different phases in the life of the WGDD, yet the main
stumbling blocks were on the issues of self-determination, collective rights and
land rights. To help the negotiations, the WGDD divided its work between
different clusters exploring possible agreements on these different issues.20 After
a few meetings of the WGDD, it became clear that some States were taking
different approaches regarding the text proposed by the Sub-Commission. In the
ﬁrst group were a limited number of States willing to support the text of the
Draft Declaration as adopted by the Sub-Commission (or with very minor
Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230 213
16) Resolution 1995/32, the text of the Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples is con-
tained in the 1994 Sub-Commision Annual Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56.
17) Resolution 1994/45.
18) Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/32.
19) These two Articles (Article 5 on the right to nationality and Article 43 on gender equality) were
endorsed at the second session of the WGDD.
20) Cluster on self-determination and autonomy (Articles 3, 31 and 36); cluster on land rights
(Articles 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30); cluster on ethnocide, distinct identity and armed conﬂicts (Articles
7, 8 and 11). See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92.
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amendments).21 In the second group were the States supporting in principle the
adoption of a declaration while opposing the Draft Declaration adopted by the
Sub-Commission, notably on the issue of self-determination and land rights.
Finally, in the third group were the States more generally opposed to the recog-
nition of the speciﬁcity of indigenous peoples’ claims and rejecting core issues
such as the existence of collective rights. From an indigenous peoples’ perspec-
tive, the debates remained very opaque as indigenous representatives were not
formally part of the process. Whereas at the Sub-Commission stage the WGIP
acted as an open forum with some space for indigenous peoples to take active
part in the development of a future declaration, at the WGDD the process
mainly remained behind close doors with no formal space left to indigenous peo-
ples’ representatives.
However, indigenous organisations and indigenous representatives coming
from the four corners of the globe did manage to maintain a very successful lob-
bying group, notably through the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples
Caucus. To react to some of the States’ unwillingness to see the emergence of a
declaration, indigenous representatives began a debate on whether a ‘no changes’
position should be adopted regarding the text of the Sub-Commission.22 Finally,
indigenous representatives agreed to consider changes to the text to the extent
that such changes comply with the principles of international law enshrined in
the UN Charter and notably the principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Overall, the debates at the WGDD level were seen by most indigenous peoples
as a very important battle for the future of indigenous rights. As several indige-
nous organisations pointed out in 2005: “[I]t has become increasingly clear that
there is an urgent need to improve the current U.N. standard-setting process on
the rights of Indigenous peoples.”23
Ultimately, at the 11th meeting of the WGDD in February 2006, the
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group, Mr. Chavez, tried to break the
deadlock by proposing that a revised version of the text incorporating several
amendments would be presented to the Commission on Human Rights (now
Human Rights Council) for adoption.24 In June 2006, when the newly estab-
lished Human Rights Council held its ﬁrst meeting, the UN Secretary General
in his opening address to the Council called for the adoption of the Draft
214 Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230
21) Such States usually included members of the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries
(GRULAC) such as Chile and Mexico. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.15/CPR.6 and UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/92.
22) Indigenous representatives agreed on a set of criteria for reviewing the text; the changes should
be “reasonable, necessary and improve or strengthen the text.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.15/CRP.2.
23) Supra note 14.
24) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79.
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Declaration “at the earliest opportunity.” Taking the lead, Peru presented a reso-
lution sponsored by several States calling for the adoption of the text as proposed
in the report of the WGDD.25 The representative of Canada called for a recorded
vote on the draft resolution, which was adopted by 30 votes to two (with 12
abstentions).26 Hence, after more than 20 years of negotiations, the Human
Rights Council adopted the ‘UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples’ and recommended it for adoption by the UN General Assembly.
While this clearly indicates a move towards a speciﬁc protection of the rights
of indigenous peoples, the recourse to a vote rather than an adoption by consen-
sus suggests that certain issues were still outstanding for a few States. As the
recording of the votes indicates, States do not have issues with the general human
rights that the Declaration reafﬁrms; the main concerns that were raised relate to
the issues of deﬁnition, self-determination, land rights and collective rights.27 For
example, the representative of the United Kingdom observed that “it did not
accept the concept of collective rights in international law”, and the representa-
tive of India pointed out that the fact that the text did not contain a deﬁnition
of ‘indigenous’ and ‘self-determination’ was problematic. These declarations
illustrate some of the important points that need to be analysed to understand
the importance of the Declaration adopted by the Human Rights Council and
why in November 2006 the Third Committee of the General Assembly deferred
the adoption of the text.28
3. Indigenous Peoples as ‘Peoples’: Definition, Self-determination and
Political Participation
Regarding indigenous peoples’ rights under international law, there is a perpetual
contention on whether or not indigenous peoples fall into the sphere of peoples’
rights. As it is a clear tenet of international law that ‘peoples’ have the right to
Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230 215
25) UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.3. Resolution presented by Peru and supported by Armenia, Benin, Congo,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Lesotho,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Venezuela, Andorra, Austria, Bolivia,
Cameroon, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Honduras, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Libyan Arab Republic, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland.
26) For details, see UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (30 June 2006), and see comments on the voting in the
discussion below.
27) For illustrations, see the comments from Argentina, the United States of America, the United
Kingdom and Ukraine.
28) The draft resolution proposed by the Third Committee calls “to defer consideration and action
on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to allow time for further con-
sultations thereon.” See UN Doc. A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev.1 (28 November 2006).
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self-determination, the rights of indigenous peoples have grown in the shadow of
this concept. To some extent, the reference to peoples’ right to self-determination
has been the most contentious issue in the development of the UN Declaration.
More generally, the reference to ‘peoples’ also raises the issue of deﬁnition as under
international law the question of who are ‘peoples’ entitled to self-determination
has not been resolved. Hence, the following discussion examines to what extent
the UN Declaration casts some light on the debates relating to deﬁnition and self-
determination.
3.1. Deﬁnition: Who are the Indigenous Peoples?
Whereas other international instruments such as the ILO Convention 169 and
the World Bank Operational Directives29 include a deﬁnition on who indige-
nous peoples are, the proposed text of the UN Declaration does not contain
such a specific definition. The need to have a definition in the Declaration
has been a contentious issue throughout the drafting of the text. On the one
hand, several States supported the inclusion of a definition, affirming that
defining ‘indigenous peoples’ was crucial in the context of the Declaration
while, on the other hand, some of the States’ representatives pointed out that
“applying the concept universally would lead to dilution of the issue, thus harm-
ing the true beneficiaries of the rights enshrined in the declaration.”30 It was
highlighted that deﬁning ‘indigenous peoples’ could lead to the creation of an
inﬂexible and exclusive concept that might not be relevant in certain regions of
the globe.31 Henceforth, the text adopted by the Human Rights Council does
not provide a definition, and the openness of the document in this regard
engages the concept of self-identiﬁcation. The choice of self-identiﬁcation was
formerly clearly expressed in the text of the Draft Declaration, as Article 8 relat-
ing to identity stated:
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their
distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as indige-
nous and the right be recognised as such.32
216 Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230
29) World Bank OP and BP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, which in Article 4(b) refers to indigenous
peoples as groups having “collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral territories
in the project area and to the natural resources in these habitats and territories.” OP 4.10 replaces the
previous OD 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples (1991) and applies to all projects for which a Project Concept
Review takes place on or after 1 July 2005. See also World Bank OD 4.20 (1991).
30) See Report on the ﬁrst session of the WGDD, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 7.
31) On this issue, see notably B. Kingsbury, ‘‘Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist
Approach to the Asian Controversy’, 92 A.J.I.L. 414 (1998).
32) Resolution 1995/32, the text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is con-
tained in the 1994 Sub-Commission Annual Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, see Article 8.
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However, at the WGDD this article attracted some controversy as some States
used it to reintroduce the idea of having a deﬁnition within the Declaration.33 As
a result, at the last session of the WGDD, Mr. Chavez proposed the deletion of
the Article, which does not appear in the text of the Declaration adopted by the
Human Rights Council. Nevertheless, Article 9 of the Declaration maintains
that: “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indige-
nous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the
community or nation concerned.” Furthermore, Article 33 afﬁrms: “Indigenous
peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accor-
dance with their customs and traditions.” Hence, even though the right to iden-
tify themselves does not formally appear in the text of the Declaration, the spirit
of the Declaration remains based on a self-identiﬁcation perspective with a right
for indigenous individuals to belong to an indigenous community.
During the drafting stages, some States expressed their concerns with self-
identiﬁcation as this could leave access to the rights in the Declaration open to
anyone who identiﬁed themselves as indigenous. In the future this could lead to
serious legal controversies on who is entitled or not to such rights for it could
authorise non-indigenous groups or individuals to claim indigenous status.
However, as indigenous representatives pointed out during the negotiations, the
right to self-identiﬁcation requires that any individual claiming the indigenous
status would have to be recognised by the members of his or her community.34
The right to self-identiﬁcation is not only an individual right but also a right to
be exercised and controlled by the community. Within such framework the right
to self-identiﬁcation is not only subjective as it is also based on an objective link
between the individual(s) and the community.
The non-inclusion of a deﬁnition in the Declaration has to be seen to be part
of the “growing respect for the principle of self-identification as an essential
aspect of individual and group freedom (. . .).”35 Even the detailed deﬁnition con-
tained in ILO Convention 169 refers to the centrality of self-identiﬁcation as
Article 1(2) states that “self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be
regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the pro-
visions of this Convention apply.” Likewise, the deﬁnition used by the World
Bank in its Operative Directives also highlights the importance of self-identiﬁca-
tion. More generally, CERD has also referred to a right to self-identiﬁcation. In
its General Recommendation 8: Identiﬁcation with a Particular Racial or Ethnic
Group, CERD affirmed that “having considered reports from States parties
Gilbert / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 (2007) 207–230 217
33) See the proposal from the US delegation to introduce a strict definition, text available in the
annex of UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, p. 23.
34) See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 14.
35) Thornberry, supra note 5, p. 15.
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concerning information about the ways in which individuals are identified as
being members of a particular racial or ethnic group, [the Committee] is of the
opinion that such identiﬁcation shall, if no justiﬁcation exists to the contrary,
be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.”36 Hence, the
proposed UN Declaration is part of the general development of a legal approach
based on a right to self-identiﬁcation.
This evolution towards a prominence of a right to self-identiﬁcation has to be
seen as part of the evolution of a right to self-determination for indigenous peo-
ples. From this perspective the right to self-identiﬁcation provides the freedom
to identify themselves, the act of self-determining their own identity. As a leader
of the Cree Nation stated: “[E]fforts to deﬁne who or what are indigenous peo-
ples are seen as further attempts to dispossess and take away our inherent right
to be. Indeed to assume a right to deﬁne indigenous peoples is to further deny
our right to self-determination.”37 As this quotation illustrates, the issue of deﬁ-
nition is important in the UN Declaration as legally it recognises indigenous
peoples as ‘peoples’ under international law, hence entitled to self-determination.
The shadow of self-determination has always been a crucial issue behind the
protracted discussion on deﬁnition.
3.2. Self-Determination
Regarding the development of the rights of indigenous peoples under interna-
tional law, self-determination is certainly the thorniest issue. The afﬁrmation of
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in Article 3 of the UN Draft
Declaration was an obstacle to the adoption of the text at the WGGD level.38
Several States expressed serious reservation to the recognition of a right to self-
determination. By contrast, indigenous representatives afﬁrmed: “[T]he right of
self-determination is the heart and soul of the declaration. We will not consent
to any language which limits or curtails the right of self-determination.”39 Finally,
after lengthy debate, Article 3 of the Declaration adopted by the Human Rights
Council recognises that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.
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36) General Recommendation 8: Identiﬁcation with a Particular Racial or Ethnic Group (Articles 1(1)
and (1)(4)), contained in UN Doc. A/45/18.
37) Quoted in I. Sjorslev, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations’, in The Indigenous World
1995–1996 (IWGIA, Copenhagen, 1996) p. 273.
38) See discussion on Article 3, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81; for an analysis of the discussion on the
issue, see K. Knop, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press,
2002) especially ch. 5.
39) As quoted in S. Pritchard (ed.), Indigenous Peoples, The United Nations, and Human Rights (Zed
Books, London, 1998) p. 46.
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It reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right of self determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.” Article 4 also relates to self-determination,
and afﬁrms: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination,
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions.”40
However, despite being clearly afﬁrmed in the Declaration, self-determination
remains a serious point of contention. In their joint statement at the Human
Rights Council, Australia, New Zealand and the US expressed their concerns
with regard to self-determination, afﬁrming that “the provisions articulating self-
determination for indigenous peoples in this text inappropriately reproduce
common Article 1 of the Covenants.” In the view of those States, this “could be
misrepresented as conferring a unilateral right to self-determination and possible
secession upon a speciﬁc subset of the national populace, thus threatening the
political unity, territorial integrity and the stability of existing UN member
states.”41 This concern regarding the protection of States’ territorial integrity has
been one of the main issues for the States involved in the drafting of the
Declaration and discussion on this issue, and it was raised at every single meet-
ing of the WGDD.42
The text of the Declaration establishes a balance between the need to recog-
nise the fundamental right to self-determination for indigenous peoples while
addressing States’ concerns on territorial integrity. Whilst the Declaration afﬁrms
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, Article 46 of the Declaration
also clearly afﬁrms that all the rights expressed in the Declaration should be exer-
cised in conformity with the rights recognised in the Charter of the United
Nations. This framework for the application of the Declaration is signiﬁcant as
one of the essential principles of the UN Charter is respect for States’ territorial
integrity. Likewise, the Declaration also states that: “In the exercise of the rights
enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms
of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall
be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law, in accordance with
international human rights obligations.”43 Thus, the right to self-determination
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40) The text was also included in the text of the Draft Declaration in its Article 31.
41) Joint statement by Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America on the Chair’s Text
on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Human Rights Council, 27 June 2006).
42) One of the amendments proposed to the right to self-determination as contained in the Draft
Declaration included reference to the principle of territorial integrity. See proposal by Norway, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/92.
43) Article 46(2) of the UN Declaration.
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will apply within the existing international human rights framework on self-
determination for indigenous peoples.
For example, when applying the right to self-determination, the jurisprudence
of the HRC on Article 1 of the ICCPR would undoubtedly have to be taken into
consideration. Under the reporting mechanism, the HRC has invited States to
report on the implementation of Article 1 of the ICCPR regarding the right of
indigenous peoples.44 The HRC has also developed a jurisprudence regarding
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination under its individual complaint
mechanisms.45 Hence, some of the States’ arguments that the affirmation of
indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination is contrary to current interna-
tional standards ignores the international legal framework that has been recently
developed around the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples.46
The text of the Declaration conﬁrms this evolution towards a speciﬁc form of
self-determination for indigenous peoples. During the debates at the WGDD,
indigenous representatives invited States to broaden their understanding of self-
determination by pointing out that for indigenous peoples self-determination is
not only about statehood and secession. On several occasions, they have high-
lighted that self-determination is about free control, choice and way of life, and
not only about secession.47 Opposition to the afﬁrmation of indigenous peoples’
right to self-determination also ignores the framework put in place within the
Declaration. The whole text of the Declaration is about strengthening partner-
ship between States and indigenous peoples, not about breaking away. The
Declaration should be seen as a framework to organise peaceful relations between
States and indigenous peoples. As Franck highlights: “[S]elf-determination pos-
tulates the right of a people in an established territory to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the dem-
ocratic entitlement.”48
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44) For examples, see Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (1999);
Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999); Concluding Observations:
Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000); Concluding Observation: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/
CO/74/SWE (2002); Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, paras. 8, 9.
45) For references, see M. Scheinin, ‘The Right to Enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and
Competing Uses of Land’, in T. S. Orlin et al. (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights: A Comparative
Interpretive Approach (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, 2000) pp. 159–222;
J. Castellino and J. Gilbert, ‘Self Determination, Indigenous Peoples and Minorities’, 3 Macquarie Law
Journal (2003) pp. 155–178.
46) See generally P. Aikio and M. Scheinin (eds.), Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to
Self-determination (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, 2001).
47) For an illustration, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84.
48) T. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 A.J.I.L. (1992) p. 52.
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3.3. The Democratic Project: From Political Participation to Free and Informed
Consent
The text of the UN Declaration is based upon principles of consultation and
cooperation between States and indigenous peoples. There is a real democratic
project behind the Declaration. This democratic project is based on a double
axiom: ﬁrstly, to ensure a right for indigenous peoples to participate in the life of
the State without facing discrimination and, secondly, to promote a right for
indigenous peoples to engage in self-development. For example, Article 5 states:
“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their
rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State.” Hence, the democratic project behind the Declaration
relies on the double afﬁrmation that indigenous peoples should:
1. have a right to enjoy their own institutions (self-development);
2. have a say in decisions affecting them (political participation).
First, the right to enjoy their own institutions is reﬂected in several key articles
of the Declaration that afﬁrm that indigenous peoples have a right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural insti-
tutions and practice and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs.49 For
example, the Declaration invites States to consult indigenous peoples’ own insti-
tutions in issues relating to education, health, housing and other economic and
social programmes affecting them.50 Furthermore, Article 34 states: “Indigenous
peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, prac-
tices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accor-
dance with international human rights standards.” This afﬁrmation reﬂects the
evolution of a human rights discourse that promotes cultural diversity and the
right for indigenous peoples to practice their own customary systems of laws.
The second aspect of the democratic project entrenched in the Declaration
relates to the right for indigenous peoples to have a say in decisions affecting them.
The Declaration afﬁrms that indigenous peoples have the right to fully participate
in the institutions and processes of governance affecting their social, economic,
political, cultural and educational development. For example, Article 18 reads:
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance
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50) Articles 14 and 21 of the UN Declaration.
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with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous deci-
sion-making institutions.
Article 19 goes further by afﬁrming:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative meas-
ures that may affect them.
Hence, the proposed text of the Declaration makes a distinction between a right to
participate in decisions that would affect indigenous peoples’ rights and a right to
consent before States implement “legislative or administrative measures that may
affect them.”
This distinction in the Declaration’s text between a right to participate and a
right to consent reﬂects previous debates that took place within CERD. CERD
has also made reference to indigenous peoples’ right to consent to decisions
directly affecting them. In its General Recommendation 23 on indigenous
peoples, CERD urged States to make sure “that no decisions directly relating to
[indigenous] rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.”51
Commenting on the drafting process that took place within the Committee on
this point, Thornberry highlights that: “[T]he consensus formula distinguishes
between the general right of effective participation in public life, and the nar-
rower issue of decisions directly affecting those indigenous groups. In the latter
case, the sense of the Committee’s deliberations appears to be that peoples do
have a right of veto.”52 Thus, the Committee made a distinction between a right
to effective participation in public life and a right to consent in decisions that
directly affect indigenous peoples. This approach is reﬂected within the proposed
text of the UN Declaration.53 Yet, the Declaration also participates in the devel-
opment of an important area of international law regarding indigenous peoples’
rights by referring to the principle of free and informed consent. Article 32 of the
Declaration states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies
for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
their mineral, water or other resources.
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51) CERD, General Recommendation 23 (51), UN Doc. CERD/C/365, in A/52/18, Annex V
(1997), para. 3.
52) Thornberry, supra note 5, p. 217.
53) A similar approach is developed under ILO Convention 169. See Article 6 of the UN Declaration.
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Thus, regarding land rights, the UN Declaration would impose a duty on States
to obtain free and informed consent from indigenous representative institutions
before undertaking any development that would affect their rights over their tra-
ditional territories.54 This particular aspect of indigenous peoples’ rights reﬂects
the speciﬁc importance of land rights for indigenous peoples.
4. Land and Territories
The unique relationship between indigenous peoples and their lands and territo-
ries is one of the key characteristic of indigenous claims.55 All indigenous cultures
have highlighted that this relationship is very different from the Western concept
of land ownership as it represents a unique spiritual, cultural, social, political and
economic relationship. Accordingly, it was expected that a universal declaration
on the rights of indigenous peoples would reﬂect the importance of land rights
for indigenous peoples. While during the negotiations at the WGDD all indige-
nous and States’ representatives usually agreed on the importance of stressing and
legally afﬁrming their special relationship to the land, there were some areas of
contention. The principal debates took place on the issues of collective rights and
land restitution.
4.1. Collective Land Rights
Regarding the importance of respecting indigenous collective territorial identity,
one of the issues that attracted some controversy during the drafting of the
Declaration related to the reference to the term ‘ethnocide’. Article 7 of the UN
Draft Declaration referred to both ‘ethnocide’ and ‘cultural genocide’. Article 7(b)
established a clear link between so called ‘cultural genocide’ and “any action
which has the aim or effect of dispossessing” indigenous peoples of their lands.
Article 7 of the UN Draft Declaration stated:
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be subject to ethno-
cide and cultural genocide, including the prevention of and redress for: (. . .) Any action
which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;56
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54) On this issue, see Expanded Working Paper Submitted by Mrs. Antoanella-Iulia Motoc and the
Tebtebba Foundation Offering Guidelines to Govern the Practice of Implementation of the Principle of Free,
Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples in Relation to Development Affecting Their Lands and
Natural Resources, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1.
55) See Final Working Paper Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, Human Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/25
(30 June 2000).
56) The Proposed American Declaration does not mention genocide. See OAS Draft Inter-American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Doc. OEA/Ser/L/V/II.90, Doc.9, Rev.1 (1995).
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While the terms ‘cultural genocide’ or ‘ethnocide’ do not appear in the 1948
Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide, indigenous representatives high-
lighted that “land was a key component of indigenous culture and dispossession
of land was paramount to ethnocide.”57 Many indigenous representatives stated
that the removal from their traditional territories often amounted to cultural
genocide as the practice of dispossession, forced relocation or population trans-
fer amounted to the destruction of their community. Thus, the adoption of
Article 7 of the Draft Declaration would have established a clear link between
land dispossession and international criminal prosecution.58
However, the terms ‘cultural genocide’ or ‘ethnocide’ do not appear in the text
adopted by the Human Rights Council. Nonetheless, the text still recognises the
crucial connection between indigenous peoples’ survival and land rights. Article
8(2)(b) afﬁrms that “states shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of,
and redress for (. . .) any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them
of their lands, territories or resources (. . .).” Generally, the text strongly upholds
that land rights are at the heart of indigenous peoples’ entitlements under interna-
tional law. At the outset, the preamble points out “that control by indigenous peo-
ples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will
enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions,
and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs.”
By and large there has been a consensus on the need to strongly afﬁrm indigenous
peoples’ land rights within the Declaration, and the fact that a large part of the text
is dedicated to land rights illustrates this agreement.
Where the disagreement began was on the issue of collective rights. This is not
limited to the sphere of indigenous peoples’ rights as usually under international
human rights law there is a debate on the issue of collective rights.59 However,
for indigenous peoples this aspect was extremely important as land rights are seen
through the lens of the community and not through the Western individual
approach to property rights. During one of the sessions of the WGDD, indige-
nous representatives highlighted: “[E]xercise of our collective rights is not only
critical to indigenous spirituality, but also [to] maintaining the inter-generational
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57) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 18.
58) Note that the Draft Declaration used the term “aim or effect”, a requirement which is less oner-
ous than the “speciﬁc intent” threshold. See J. Gilbert, ‘Environmental Degradation as a Threat to Life:
A Question of Justice?’, 6 Trinity College Law Review (2003) pp. 81–97.
59) For references, see P. Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights and Peoples’ Rights’, 21:1 H.R.Q.
(1999) pp. 80–97; M. Freeman, ‘Are There Collective Human Rights?’, 43 Political Studies (1995) p. 25;
M. Scheinin, ‘How to Resolve Conﬂicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?’, in M. Scheinin and
R. Toivanen (eds.), Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights (2005) pp. 219–238; G. Gilbert,
‘Individuals, Collectivities and Rights’, in N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Minorities, Peoples, and
Self-Determination (2005).
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nature of all our social, cultural, economic and political rights.”60 They also
pointed out that “a key element of indigenous collective rights is the profound
social, cultural, economic and spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with
our lands, territories, resources and environment.”61 The Declaration’s text recog-
nises the collective nature of land rights. For example, Article 26 states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territo-
ries and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
The bearers of the rights clearly are indigenous peoples. Thus, despite the politi-
cal debates surrounding the issue of collective rights, the UN Declaration reﬂects
the emerging legal acknowledgment of a collective nature of property rights for
indigenous peoples. The IACHR in the Awas Tingni case clearly afﬁrmed the
right to property in lands for “members of indigenous communities within the
framework of commonality of possession (. . .).”62 ILO Convention 169 also recog-
nises the collective nature of property in lands for indigenous peoples, and the
jurisprudence of the HRC and CERD also emphasise the collective nature of this
connection.63 Hence, on this issue, the UN Declaration conforms to other inter-
national standards that are all pointing towards the emergence of indigenous
peoples’ collective rights to land.
Regarding the consequences of such a recognition, the Declaration’s text is not
as clear as other international instruments. For example, whereas other instru-
ments make land demarcation a clear obligation for States, the Declaration
remains silent on this issue. Indigenous representatives have called for the intro-
duction of an amendment to Article 25 of the Draft Declaration’s text to include
a reference to the need for the demarcation of indigenous lands.64 Such references
appear in the ILO Convention 169, as Article 14(2) of the Convention reads:
“Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peo-
ples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their
rights of ownership and possession.” The HRC has also taken a dynamic
approach and interpreted Article 27 of the ICCPR as requiring States to ensure
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60) Proposals by indigenous representatives, seventh session of the WGDD, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98,
Annex II, p. 28.
61) Ibid.
62) The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 13, para. 148.
63) CERD, General Recommendation 23, supra note 51, para. 5. For a discussion on collective land
rights, see J. Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors
(Transnational Publishers-Martinus Nijhof, 2006) pp. 85–115.
64) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, p. 17, para. 110.
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the demarcation of indigenous peoples’ territories in order to provide an effective
protection of such territories. For example, the HRC recommended that Brazil
ensure the demarcation of indigenous territories. The Committee stated: “[I]n
light of article 27 of the Covenant, all necessary measures should be taken to
ensure that the process of demarcation of indigenous lands be speedily and justly
settled.”65 Similarly, in the Awas Tingni case, the IACHR found that Nicaragua
had not respected its obligation to demarcate land on the basis of Article 21 of
the American Convention on Human Rights.66
Although there is an emergence of a clear right to land demarcation, the text
adopted by the Human Rights Council does not mention a State’s obligation for
land demarcation. The Declaration remains vague by afﬁrming that “states shall
give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources” but
does not provide for a clear obligation to demarcate indigenous lands. However,
despite these limitations, the Declaration remains very strong on land rights.
And it is certain that by clearly afﬁrming the importance of the recognition of
indigenous peoples’ collective right to their land, the UN Declaration will par-
ticipate in the development of a stronger legal corpus of laws on collective rights.
In the end, the Declaration proposes a good balance between individual and col-
lective rights. The preamble affirms “that indigenous individuals are entitled
without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and
that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their
existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.” This idea that collec-
tive rights and individual rights are not necessarily antonymic is certainly one of
the keystones in the development of indigenous peoples’ rights. Hence, the adop-
tion of the Declaration will mark an important step towards the afﬁrmation of
collective rights for indigenous peoples.
4.2. Dealing with the Past: From Restitution to Redress
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands derive from traditional occupation and
indigenous laws and customs relating to land ownership. In this regard, interna-
tional law is dealing with arguments of a historical nature. The preamble of the
Declaration recognises that indigenous peoples have suffered historical injustices
as the result of the colonisation and dispossession of their lands. Hence, even
though international human rights law is concerned with the present situation
facing indigenous peoples, it is certain that in addressing indigenous peoples’
land rights the ‘weight of history’ cannot be ignored. This was the subject of
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intense debates during the drafting of the Declaration. It is reflected in the
drafting of Article 26, and Article 26(2) adopted by the Human Rights Council
differs from the proposed text adopted by the Sub-Commission. Article 26 of the
Sub-Commission text stated:
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and terri-
tories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, ﬂora
and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied
or used.67
This connection between traditional occupation of lands and present day occu-
pation was seen as controversial by several of the States involved in the work of
the WGDD. For example, Australia pointed out that it would support Article 26
only if “it applied to lands that indigenous peoples currently owned or exclu-
sively used.”68 Whereas the text of the Draft Declaration was afﬁrming indige-
nous peoples’ rights to land ownership over territories owned in the past, the text
adopted by the Human Rights Council recognises such right of ownership only
over territories owned by indigenous peoples at present. Article 26(2) of the UN
Declaration adopted by the Human Rights Council provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.69
Thus, the right of ownership concerns only lands that indigenous peoples presently
occupy. The connection between traditional occupation and the present day that
was present in the ex-Article 26 has been suppressed. Instead, the debate on the
relationship between past dispossession and contemporary land claims was rele-
gated to the discussion on Article 27, which relates to a right to land restitution.
The issue of restitution is crucial when addressing land rights. The question of
land rights is often a question of restoring lands that were taken under a past dis-
criminatory enterprise and linked to a continuing denial of indigenous peoples’
rights. Against such a background, the Draft Declaration referred to a right of
restitution for indigenous peoples. Article 27 of the Draft Declaration stated:
Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been
conﬁscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where
this is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation. Unless otherwise
freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands,
territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status.
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However, at the WGDD, several States expressed concern regarding the afﬁrma-
tion of a right to land restitution in the Declaration’s text, notably highlighting
that such a right might impact on third party rights. Some States also expressed
concerns on this Article, arguing that such a right to restitution was not part of
international legal standards. However, as pointed out by several indigenous
organisations, there are clear standards on indigenous peoples’ right to land resti-
tution coming from some of the UN human rights treaty bodies.70 For example,
CERD in its General Recommendation 23 on indigenous peoples afﬁrms the
existence of such a right to restitution.71 The HRC in its Concluding Observations
on Guatemala also referred to indigenous peoples’ right to “the restitution of
communal lands.”72 Despite this background, no agreement was reached on
Article 27 of the Draft Declaration. This resulted in an amended version of the
Article which refers to a right to redress. The Article adopted by the Human
Rights Council reads:
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or,
when this is not possible, of a just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, terri-
tories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used,
and which have been conﬁscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free,
prior and informed consent.
Hence, restitution of land becomes part of a larger right to redress and not the
main principle. Yet, regarding the practical implementation of such a right, the
Declaration reafﬁrms the rule that restitution should be the ﬁrst principle, and
only when it is not possible should other methods of compensation be contem-
plated. This approach reflects the position adopted by CERD in its General
Comment 23, which states that: “[O]nly when this is for factual reasons not pos-
sible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and
prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible take the
form of lands and territories.”73 This reﬂects the situation that for indigenous
peoples monetary compensation disregards the fact that land ownership is not
merely a source of individual economic security but the core of indigenous cul-
tures and religions. At the WGDD, indigenous peoples’ representatives have
emphasised “that owing to the special nature of their relationship to their lands,
ﬁnancial compensation did not provide adequate redress for the loss incurred.”74
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70) See the joint submission submitted to the WGDD on November 2005, Indigenous Peoples’ Right
to Restitution, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/CRP.4.
71) CERD, General Recommendation 23, supra note 51, para. 5.
72) Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM
(27 August 2001), para. 29.
73) Ibid., para. 5.
74) Seventh session of the WGDD, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 19.
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The Article adopted by the Human Rights Council integrates this concern in the
form of an ‘equitable compensation’ that might be awarded only when restitu-
tion is not possible. This clear principle on means of redress afﬁrmed by the UN
Declaration will certainly have some important practical importance in legal
decision-making at both the international and national level as the issue of reme-
dies for past violations remains a very volatile area of international law where
clear principles, such as the one afﬁrmed in the Declaration, are needed. From
this perspective, when adopted the UN Declaration could also have some inter-
esting consequences on the broader issue of reparation for past wrongs.
5. Conclusion
Regarding the role of the UN human rights machinery in the development of
indigenous peoples’ rights, a lot of time and effort have been spent on the devel-
opment of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. One might
ask whether such a focus was beneﬁcial, as after more than 20 years of negotia-
tion, the result might ‘only’ be a declaration, i.e. a non-legally binding instru-
ment. As developed in this article, for several reasons the fight to get to a
declaration is worthy. First, it has to be borne in mind that declarations are essen-
tial texts. The whole contemporary human rights framework started around the
1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights. From this perspective, the
Declaration might well be the start rather than the end. Linked to this idea, the
Declaration will act as an essential afﬁrmation of indigenous peoples’ rights, as
Article 42 afﬁrms: “[T]he rights recognised herein constitute the minimum stan-
dards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the
world.” As highlighted earlier, there clearly was a need for such a declaration to
ensure the development of a coherent body of international law regarding indige-
nous peoples. The Declaration will ensure such coherence by serving as a frame-
work for the development of future instruments regarding indigenous peoples’
rights from very diverse international bodies such as WIPO or UN Educational,
Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for example.
More generally, regarding the development of human rights law, a declaration
will mark an important step towards the afﬁrmation of collective rights. By estab-
lishing a delicate balance between individual and collective rights for indigenous
peoples, the Declaration will potentially illustrate that the recognition of collec-
tive rights does not necessarily amount to the denial of the rights of individuals.
The clear afﬁrmation of collective rights is crucial for the development of a truly
universal understanding of human rights values. The human rights legal frame-
work has often been criticised for being based on the Western ideal of individual
rights, and from this perspective the afﬁrmation of collective rights for indigenous
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peoples clearly indicates that such a vision is imperfect. The road might have
been a long one, but in the end indigenous peoples’ inputs to the text have been
maintained, and this opens the way towards a more culturally diverse approach
to human rights law.
Even though indigenous peoples reﬂect the tremendous diversity of the world,
living in some of the most remote parts of the globe, it is striking to realise how
they have all agreed on the need for such an international instrument that would
express their right to maintain a different cultural, social and economic way of
life. For centuries indigenous peoples have been the victims of international law,
especially with the rule governing territorial acquisition justifying discriminatory
States’ practices towards indigenous peoples.75 Hence, the Declaration could be
seen as one of the ﬁrst formal universal afﬁrmations on the rights of indigenous
peoples under international law. It also indicates the emergence of indigenous
peoples as identiﬁable actors of the international system. As Thornberry high-
lights, “international law is conceived as a kind of club and members must accept
the rules.”76 Indigenous peoples are latecomers to this ‘exclusive club’. Until
recently, the ‘exclusive club’ was only open to States, and in many ways the
indigenous peoples’ movement has challenged such assumptions by claiming
their right to access the international stage. The emphasis from the UN on part-
nership and mutual respect between States and indigenous peoples offers an
important new forum for discussion, and the UN Declaration would certainly
become an important factor for increasing such dialogue. Overall, the adoption
of the UN Declaration will indicate an important departure from a bloody past
where international law played an important role in the destruction of indige-
nous cultures, and from this perspective the Declaration is a promising step
towards a future based on partnership and mutual respect.
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75) See Gilbert, supra note 63, chs. 1, 2.
76) Thornberry, supra note 5, p. 8.
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